The Effect of Uncertainty on a Joint Product Model of Smuggling by Fausti, Scott
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Department of Economics Staff Paper Series Economics
9-10-1992
The Effect of Uncertainty on a Joint Product Model
of Smuggling
Scott Fausti
South Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper
Part of the International Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Open
PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fausti, Scott, "The Effect of Uncertainty on a Joint Product Model of Smuggling" (1992). Department of Economics Staff Paper Series.
Paper 89.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper/89
THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON A JOINT 
PRODUCT MODEL OF SMUGGLING 
by 
Scott w. Fausti 
Economics Staff Paper No. 92-6 
September 1992 
The Effect of uncertainty on a Joint 
Product Model of Smuggling 
Scott Fausti1 
South Dakota State University2 
ABSTRACT 
Extending the seminal work of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) on 
smuggling, Pitt (1981) developed a new approach to investigate 
the welfare effect of smuggling. This paper develops an 
extension of Pitt's original model which allows many of the 
interesting features of the Bhagwati and Hansen model to be 
revaluated within a joint product model of smuggling framework. 
The extension is made through the following modifications to 
Pitt's assumptions: 1) firms that export are free to engage in 
joint product smuggling or strictly legal trade; and 2) 
uncertainty is introduced into the model via active government 
enforcement. 
The modifications enable the model to reexamine the 
ambiguous welfare results derived in the papers by Pitt, and 
Bhagwati and Hansen. The model explains why the ambiguous 
welfare results were derived and demonstrates that the welfare 
effect of smuggling can indeed be positive, even if smuggling 
incurs a real resource cost. 
1 I wish to thank Don Coes, Bob Gillespie, Earl Grinols and 
Chuck Lamberton for their comments on the issues discussed in 
this paper. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. 
2 All correspondence should be directed to Asst. Prof Scott 
Fausti, Department of Economics, South Dakota State 
University, Scobey Hall Box 504A, Brookings, SD 57007 
I. Introduction. 
The paper by Pitt (1981} on illegal transactions in 
international trade questioned the results of the seminal paper 
on illegal transactions by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973). The 
purpose of this paper is to explore how Pitt's welfare results 
are affected when risk and the firm's attitude toward risk are 
introduced in conjunction with the firm's freedom to choose 
between strictly legal trade and joint product smuggling. The 
modified model of joint product smuggling developed in this paper 
permits many of the essential features of the Bhagwati and Hansen 
model to be incorporated into the analysis. This is accomplished 
by developing the role of government enforcement within the crime 
theoretic framework for the analysis of joint product 
smuggling. 1 
In this essay Pitt's model of joint product export smuggling 
is modified to incorporate aptive government enforcement of 
smuggling laws; thereby introducing uncertainty. The model 
develops a decision mechanism which determines whether the firm 
will smuggle. The firm's attitude toward risk affects this 
decision process. The model requires the smuggling firm to 
include the real resource costs of smuggling and expected 
punishment in its output price. These two factors affect 
production and output price if the firm smuggles. The firm's 
smuggling decision determines the long run equilibrium domestic 
1 Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to introduce 
the crime theoretic approach to the analysis of smuggling. 
1 
price ratio. The results of the model indicate that: 1) it is 
the firm's attitude toward risk in conjunction with the real 
resource cost of smuggling that determines the welfare effect of 
smuggling; 2) if firms are risk neutral or risk averse and they 
decide to smuggle, then smuggling is welfare enhancing under 
certain conditions; and 3) the assumption of a significant real 
resource cost is only a partial explanation for the ambiguous 
welfare results found in the earlier smuggling literature. 2 
II. Assumptions. 
The basic assumptions of Pitt's model of smuggling are the 
starting point for this paper. Pitt assumes the small country 
case with the terms of trade fixed. The country produces two 
traded goods, an exportable (X) and an importable (M), employing 
primary factors purchased in competitive markets. Production and 
trade are carried out by identical firms. Legal and illegal 
trade in exports is carried out by the same firm. The law of one 
price holds in the domestic economy. 
The following additional assumptions are made so that a 
model of smuggling incorporating uncertainty can be developed: 1) 
firms that smuggle may not incur a significant real smuggling 
cost; 3 2) smugglers (firms) are natives and therefore their 
utility functions are embodied in the country's social welfare 
2 See Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Pitt (1980), Martin and 
Pangariya (1984), and Sheikh (1989). 
3 cooper (1974) and Deardorff and Stopler (1988) argue that 
smuggling may not impose any significant real cost on society over 
legal trade. 
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function; 3) export taxes are assumed to be non-prohibitive; 4) 
firms must bear the risk of illegal activity and they cannot 
insure against criminal penalties; 5) exporting firms have a 
choice between strictly legal trade or smuggling, with the choice 
based on profit maximization; and, 6) if the domestic exporting 
firm decides to smuggle, it will then produce a joint product, 
and legal trade will act as a cloak for the firm's illegal 
activity. The firm can use four methods to smuggle exports: a) 
under-invoicing of exports; b) falsely declared exports; c) 
under-assessment of exports; and d) clandestine smuggling of 
unreported production. 4 
III. A Joint Product Model of Smuggling. 
In addition to the assumptions made in the previous section, 
it is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to a 
modified Pitt smuggling function, 
s* = G (L, S) . (1) 
The variable (S*) is the quantity of good (X) made ready to 
be smuggled. The variable (S*) in this model is defined as 
exports made ready for smuggling across the domestic border or, 
in other words, smuggling attempted. The variable (L) is the 
quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of 
good (X) input into smuggling activity. The function (G} is 
strictly concave and a twice. differentiable linear homogeneous 
4 Deardorff and Stolper (1988} discuss the widespread use of 
smuggling method (d) in a number of African countries. 
3 
function. The function (G) is assumed to have the following 
properties: 
GL � o, GLL s o, 
1 � G8 � 0, Gss S O, 
G (O,S)=O, 
G (L,O)=O, 
s-s* � o, acs-s*)/aL <o, acs-s*)/as >o. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Assumption (2) states that the marginal smuggling product of 
legal trade used in smuggling is non-negative and is declining in 
(L). Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the smuggling 
input (S) results in a positive but less than unit increase in 
actual amount of the export made ready to be smuggled, and the 
marginal product of (S) is declining. Assumption (4) states that 
legal trade is a necessary input into smuggling or the 
probability of detection is one. Assumption (5) states that 
firms can choose to engage in legal trade only. Assumption (6) 
prohibits the real resource cost of smuggling from being 
negative. The real resource cost of smuggling (s-s*) is the 
smuggler's selling cost in excess of legal trade selling cost. It 
is assumed that the actual magnitude of smuggling's real resource 
cost is exogenous to the model. However, a change in one of the 
endogenous variables (L) or (S), affects the marginal resource 
cost of smuggling. A one-unit increase in (L), ceteris paribus, 
reduces the marginal real resource cost of smuggling. A one-unit 
increase in (S), ceteris paribus, increases the marginal real 
resource cost of smuggling. 
4 
In the literature, smuggling•s ambiguous welfare effect is 
the direct result of how the real resource cost assumption is 
modeled. 5 A negative welfare effect results from an excessive 
real resource cost incurred by smugglers, while an insignificant 
real resource cost produces a positive welfare effect. As an 
example, Pitt assumes that the cost of smuggling is composed of 
either penalties and confiscation or a mixture of a real resource 
cost and penalties and confiscation. His welfare result is 
ambiguous because the composition of the cost mix is unknown. We 
alter Pitt's assumption and assume that the difference between 
(S) and (S*) is a real resource cost incurred from the use of 
cloaking tactics employed to evade detection. 6 
Smuggling is assumed to incur a risk of detection (p) , 
(l�p�O) such that (p=l) if (L=O) . The expected value of illegal 
goods intercepted as they are moved over the border is (p•Pf•S*) 
or (Pf •S*) if (L=O) . The variable (Pf) is the world price of 
exports. The expected value of successful smuggling is ( (1-
p) Pf•S*]. The variable (F) is a multiple of the value of 
intercepted illegal goods which is imposed as a fine, (F�l) . The 
expected cost of interception to the smuggler is (p•F•Pf•s*) and 
is at least (Pf ·S*) if (L=O) . Expected smuggling revenue net of 
5 see Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) , Pitt (1981) , Martin and 
Panagariya (1984) , and Sheikh (1989) . 
6 The real resource cost, for example, may take the form of: 
1) special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods; and 2) 
the transport cost of shipping unreported production out of the 
country via clandestine ports. 
5 
interception cost is equal to [ (1-p·F)·Pf·s*J and is non-positive 
if (L=O). 
The expected value of output price per unit of smuggled good 
at the border for the smuggling firm is E[P5 ] = (1-p·F) .pf, and 
is non-positive if (L=O). The expected value of revenue per input 
unit of the smuggled good at the border for the smuggling firm is 
E(P8]· (S*/S) = (1-p·F) •Pf • (S*/s), and is non-positive if (L=O). 
The expected value for the output price per unit of legally 
exported goods is E[PL] = pf• (l-t) = pL, and represents the legal 
tax distorted price for exports. The variable (t) denotes the 
export tax. It is assumed the firm knows the values of these 
risk factors. 
It is assumed each firm has a decision to make. The firm 
can engage in joint product smuggling or it can sell its output 
at the legal domestic export tax distorted price (PL), as implied 
by the assumption G (L, 0)=0.7 If the firm decides to smuggle, it 
receives the weighted average price for its total output. 
If the firm decides to become involved in joint product 
illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery. 
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on variables 
(p, y•, F). The probability of apprehension (p) is determined by 
the government. It is assumed the firm's probability of being 
caught is (p), if it engages in cloaking activities. If it does 
not cloak its illegal activity, then the probability of 
7 strictly legal trade profits are derived from equation (7) 
when it is assumed S=O. 
6 
apprehension is equal to one. The variable (F} determines the 
monetary equivalent of the punishment imposed on the firm by the 
government if it is caught in the illegal act of smuggling. 
Fines are considered a transfer to the government. As in Pitt's 
paper; profit maximization in production implies producing on the 
production possibility curve where the marginal rate of 
transformation equals domestic relative prices (P*}. The 
variable (Y8) represents profits from joint product export trade. 
Smugglers are assumed to be profit maximizers. Expected 
profit for the smuggling fir� is given by equation (7) , 
E (Y8) =Pf•G (L,S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L,S) + pf. (1-t) •L - P*• (L+S) •
8 (7) 
The term [Pf•G (L,S) - (p) ·F·Pf•G (L,S) ] denotes expected 
smuggling revenues; pf• (l-t) •L represents revenues for legal 
trade. As in Pitt's article, firms earn zero economic profit in 
the long run. Setting equation (7) to zero and solving for p* 
generates an expression for the long run equilibrium domestic 
price ratio as a weighted average of prices received for goods 
legally exported in conjunction with goods illegally exported: 
p* = [ (1-p·F) ·Pf• (S*) ]/ (L+S) + [Pf• (l-t) • (L) ]/ (L+S) . (8) 
The exporting firm's decision of whether to engage in strictly 
legal trade (S=O) or engage .in smuggling and produce a joint 
product (L+S*} will determine the long run equilibrium domestic 
price ratio (DPR}. If firms smuggle, then Pitt's "price 
disparity" result is generated. 
8 The first order conditions can be found in appendix (A) . 
7 
IV. The Role of Uncertainty in the Smuggling Decision. 
The act of smuggling incurs a risk. The exporting firm's 
attitude toward the risk will effect its decision to smuggle or 
engage in strictly legal trade. This section applies the 
methodology developed by Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) to address 
the uncertainty issue in this paper. 
Joint product illegal trade profit represents an uncertain 
prospect and legal trade profit represents a certain prospect. 
The term (fl) represents the difference between the expected value 
of illegal profit and legal profit; it follows that there exists 
a (fl*) such that the firm is indifferent between legal and 
illegal trade. The value of (fl*) depends on the firm's attitude 
toward risk. Applying Pratt's results we can define (fl*) as a 
risk premium and the functional form of (n*) is given in equation 
(9) ' 
fl/ = (1/2) •VAR (Y) • -{U" (Y) + U' (Y) }. (9) 
The measure of absolute risk aversion is defined as 
-[U" (Y) /U' (Y) ], and is employed as the measure of the firm's 
attitude toward risk in this section. The following conditions 
arise from equation (9) : 1) the value of (n*) for the firm will 
be negative if (U">O) ; 2) positive if (U"<O) ; and 3) zero if 
(U"=O) . This implies, respectively, that the firm prefers, 
averts, or is neutral toward risk. In this paper the risk 
preferring case is not addressed. The variable {n*) represents 
the insurance premium the firm would be willing to pay if it 
could insure itself against criminal penalties. Therefore, (n*) 
8 
represents the minimum value of risk premium necessary to make 
the firm indifferent to smuggling. This implies that, in 
equilibrium, at the margin, smugglers that are risk averse earn 
higher profits than in legal activities. Smugglers who are risk 
neutral earn the same amount of profits as in legal trade. 9 
Hence, (11'*) serves as proxy.for Cooper's "threshold of law 
abidingness. 1110 Whenever (7l'>7l'*), then the firm will become 
involved in smuggling. 
In the paper by Sheikh (1989), a positive equilibrium level 
of economic profit is considered a "reward" to smugglers who are 
risk averse as compensation for the mental anguish incurred by 
participating in a risky venture. In this paper, the risk premium 
(11'*) represents the smuggler's compensation. As in Sheikh's 
paper, there is a unique perfectly competitive equilibrium in 
this model where the cost associated with the amount of mental 
anguish is exactly equal to the reward for risk (11'*). 
Assume the exporting firm reacts to uncertainty as described 
above. Long run economic profit is then equal to zero for the 
risk neutral firm. It follows that economic profit is positive 
for the risk averse firm. This assumption modifies equation (7) 
and long run equilibrium expected profit for the smuggling firm 
is: 
9 Becker (1968) used this approach to examine the effect of 
uncertainty on criminal behavior. 
10 See Cooper (1974), for a discussion of the factors which 
influence a firm to smuggle or continue in legal trade, p.186. 
9 
E (Y5) =Pf•G (L,S) - (p) •F•Pf•G (L,S) + pf. (1-t) •L - p*. (L+S) =n*. (10) 
Solving equation (10) for P* generates a new expression for the 
(DPR) : 
p* = [  (1-p•F) . pf. (S*) ]/ (L+S) + [Pf• (1-t) • (L) ]/ (L+S) -n*/ (L+S) . (11) 
Long run equilibrium domestic relative price is now a 
function of the weighted average price of joint product 
smuggling, which includes the risk premium (n*) . The firm's 
decision to engage in joint product smuggling or strictly legal 
trade is determined by the firm's decision criteria condition: 
max [Pf · (1-t) , pf. (s*+s) • (1-p•F) -n*/S]. (12) 
Condition (12) states that if the expected value of revenue per 
input unit of smuggled good, less the per unit risk premium, is 
greater than the per unit revenue that could be earned by selling 
(S) through legal channels, then all firms smuggle and DPR=P*. If 
not, then the DPR=PL. The following statements outline the firm's 
decision mechanism for engaging in joint product smuggling or the 
strictly legal trade alternative: 
pf. g*. (1-p•F) - n* pf. g. (1-t) , (13) 
if pf· (S*/S) • (1-p•F) -n*/S < pf. (1-t) , then S=O, DPR is pL, (14) 
if pf· (S*/s) • (1-p•F) -n*/s > pf. (1-t) , then S>O, DPR is p*, (15) 
if pf· (s*/s) • (1-p·F) -n*/s = pf. (1-t) , 
then the type of firm activity is indeterminate, pL=P*. (16) 
statement (13) compares total revenue (Pf•S*• (l-p·F) ) coming from 
illegal trade minus the risk premium to the total revenue 
(Pf•S• (l-t) ) which would be earned by channeling (S) through 
legal channels. Statements (14-16) are derived from (13) . 
10 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality (ff*=O) and a real 
cost associated with smuggling (s-s*>o) , the (OPR) is determined 
by the firm's decision to smuggle or engage in strictly legal 
trade. The firm's choice is based on the decision criteria found 
in statements (14-15) . Statement (16) reveals the necessary 
condition for the coexistence of legal trade only firms (S=O) 
with firms that smuggle (joint product exports) . This model, 
unlike models in the previous literature, requires the smuggling 
firm to account for the real resource cost incurred by smuggling 
in the firm's output price structure. However, if the firm 
decides to smuggle, welfare may not be enhanced due to the real 
resource cost. 
The real resource cost of smuggling in this model is equal 
to pf• (s-s*) and represents the total welfare loss associated 
with smuggling. The negative welfare effect can be divided into 
two parts: 1) a negative effect on prices and therefore 
production; and 2) a loss in government revenue. The negative 
price effect (1-p•F) ·Pf• (s-s*) is internalized by the smuggling 
firm and is reflected in the firm's output price. The welfare 
loss due to a real resource cost not accounted for in the 
smuggling firm's output price is the value of lost government 
confiscation revenues that would have accrued if (s-s·�o) . The 
welfare loss not accounted for by the firm can be considered a 
dead weight loss to society . (OWL) and it is equal to: 
OWL = (p•F) •Pf• (S-S*) . (17) 
11 
The overall welfare effect of smuggling depends on whether 
additional revenues accruing to the firm from the act of 
smuggling outweigh the negative welfare effect of the dead weight 
loss due to the real resource cost. 
A comparison of the welfare level attained when all risk 
neutral firms smuggle to the welfare level achieved when all 
firms engage in strictly legal trade can be determined by 
answering two questions: l} what effect does smuggling have on 
the domestic price ratio; and 2} is the total social value of 
exported goods smuggled cs*} greater than the total social value 
of those exports if (S) were shipped through legal channels? The 
first question is answered by statements (14) through (16}, 
smuggling will only occur if expected smuggling revenue is 
greater than or equal to legal trade revenue, which implies 
(P*�pL) . The second question can be answered by first assuming 
(P*>PL) ,  then by rearranging statement {13}, 
pf.g*. (1-p•F) - 1r* - Pf•S• (1-t) > 0. 11 {18} 
If {P*>PL}, then (18} states that the smuggling firm receives a 
higher total value for its exports by engaging in illegal trade. 
The firm, however, does not consider the {DWL} to society 
generated by the real resource cost associated with smuggling. 
For smuggling to increase the total social value of exports in 
comparison to the strictly legal trade alternative, statement 
(19) must be true, 
11 Note, when it is assumed that firms are risk neutral then 
{1r*=O) . 
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If statement (19} is true, then the change in total revenues 
generated from smuggling over non-smuggling is greater than 
(OWL), and the total social value of exports increases. 
simplifying (19) we have (20), 
(19) 
P� (s*/S} > pf • (l-t) + pf · (p·F) + ff*/s. (20) 
In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement (15), it is 
clear that (20} is the stronger condition. Which indicates that 
it is possible for firms to decide to engage in smuggling and 
have the act of smuggling reduce the total social value of 
exports. If however, the per unit revenue of smuggling input is 
greater than the combined per unit value of: l} the legal trade 
revenue alternative for (S} ; and 2} expected punishment, then 
smuggling increases the social value of exports. We can now 
assert that statement (20} is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for risk neutral firms to engage in smuggling and 
increase the total social value of exports over the non-smuggling 
alternative. 
An analysis of the social welfare effect of smuggling, 
however, must also consider the effect smuggling has on the 
(DPR} . For this purpose an indirect utility function (V} is 
introduced. It is assumed (V} can be used as a proxy for social 
welfare. Assume welfare is a function of the (DPR) and income 
(Y} . It is assumed that an improvement (increase) in (DPR} 
increases social welfare. It is assumed that income is 
positively related to the total social value of exports. The 
13 
total social value of exports includes both private and public 
sector revenues generated by the export trade. Assume all other 
income sources are held constant and enforcement effort does not 
incur a real resource cost. Under these assumptions the 
following indirect utility function is defined as V (OPR, Y), and 
has the following properties; oV/oOPR>O, oV/oY>0. 12 
If statement (15) is true then firms will smuggle. If 
condition (20) is also satisfied, then the welfare effect will be 
positive. This is due to the fact that the change in domestic 
price ratio and the change in the total social value of exports 
are both positive, and welfare improves via the social welfare 
function (V). The welfare effect of smuggling, however, is 
ambiguous if condition (20) is not met. This ambiguous result is 
the outcome of the (OPR) still increasing, but (Y) declining. 
This set of results establishes that the ambiguous welfare 
results obtained by Bhagwati and Hansen and Pitt can only occur 
when smuggling incurs an excessive real resource cost. Unlike 
their analysis, however, this paper provides the mathematical 
condition necessary for the ambiguous welfare result to occur, 
otherwise smuggling has an unambiguous positive welfare effect. 
12 The indirect utility function (V) has the following 
properties: 1) (V) is continuous at all OPR>O, and Y>O; 2) (V) is 
non-decreasing in (OPR) and (Y); and 3) (V) is homogenous of degree 
zero in (DPR) and (Y). It should be noted that an increase in the 
(OPR) implies an improvement in domestic relative prices. For a 
discussion of the properties of the indirect utility function see 
Varian (1984). 
14 
Smuggling coexisting with strictly legal trade can occur 
when (P*=PL). If smuggling is coexisting with strictly legal 
trade, then the change in the domestic price ratio is zero and 
the change in the total social value of exports is negative as 
(19) indicates since (Pf•S*• (-1-p•F) - pt .5. (1-t)=O). In this 
situation (16), smuggling either ends or the welfare effect is 
negative. However, in this case the existence of strictly legal 
trade and/or smuggling is indeterminate. This result mirrors 
that attained by Bhagwati and Hansen when (P*=PL), and their 
conclusion of "the less smuggling the better" holds. 
If it is assumed that the real resource cost of smuggling is 
insignificant (S*/s�1), with penalties and confiscation 
representing the significant cost to the smuggling firm, then 
Pitt's strictly positive welfare result is reproduced in this 
model. 13 Statements (13) and (15) indicate that the firm will 
smuggle only if export revenue earned from smuggling is greater 
than export revenue from strictly legal trade, in this case the 
welfare effect is strictly positive. Statement (16) expresses 
that legal-trade-only firms (S=O) may coexist with firms that 
smuggle (joint product) only when the value of expected 
punishment equals the export tax, which implies the export price 
received from both types of trade are equal. If smuggling exists 
in this situation, then the welfare effect is neutral. This 
13 This is a strong assumption for this model, and is made only 
to discuss Pitt's results under this assumption within the context 
of this model. 
15 
situation allows both types of firm activity to coexist in the 
Pitt framework. 
The implications of these results are: 1) if the expected 
punishment associated with smuggling is less than the export tax, 
all firms smuggle; 2) without a significant real resource cost 
associated with smuggling, the welfare level for the "all firms 
smuggling" situation is greater than the non-smuggling 
alternative due to smuggling's relative price effect; and 3) the 
welfare effect of smuggling is dependent on the level of expected 
punishment (p • F) •14 
In the previous example of a risk neutral firm not incurring 
a real resource cost, it was demonstrated that the firm was 
indifferent in the choice between strictly legal trade or 
smuggling when (t = p •F) . For this specific case the actual 
profit differential (ff) is equal to zero, and the risk premium 
(ff*) required by the risk neutral firm is equal to zero. The risk 
averse firm, however, requires (ff�ff*) to engage in smuggling. 
suppose for example, that the actual risk premium being generated 
when a firm smuggles (S*) in lieu of exporting (S) through legal 
channels is equal to: 
(21) 
For the risk averse firm (ff*) is positive. If (ff) is greater than 
(ff*) , then the firm will smuggle as indicated by statement (15) . 
14 Without a significant real resource cost to smuggling, the 
cost of smuggling to the firm represents just a transfer of revenue 
to the government. The aggregate rate of transformation in trade in 
this situation is the free trade terms of trade as in Pitt's paper. 
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The effect of smuggling on social welfare depends on if the risk 
premium earned by smugglers is greater than the (OWL) associated 
with smuggling. In comparing (20) to decision criteria statement 
(15), it is clear that it is possible for firms to decide to 
engage in smuggling and have the act of smuggling reduce the 
total social value of exports. If, however, the per unit revenue 
of smuggling input is greater than the combined per unit value 
of: 1) the legal trade revenue alternative for (S); 2) expected 
punishment; and 3) the risk premium, then smuggling increases the 
social value of exports. We can now assert that statement (20) is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for risk averse firms to 
engage in smuggling and increase the total social value of 
exports over the non-smuggling alternative. 
If condition (20) holds, the welfare effect of smuggling by 
risk averse firms is positive. This result occurs because both 
the (DPR) and (Y) increase. Income increases because the total 
social value of exports in the presence of smuggling is greater 
than the non-smuggling alternative. If (20) is not true, then 
the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The results of the 
risk averse case mirror the risk neutral case. 
The next welfare issue to be addressed is when smuggling and 
strictly legal trade coexist. This situation is stated in (16). 
The coexistence of the two types of trade can only occur when if 
[P* = pL+ff*/ (L+S)]. This implies that the law of one price breaks 
down and allows a type of parallel market structure to develop. 
The (DPR) is now composed of a weighted average of (P*) and (PL). 
17 
The effect on the total social value of exports for this 
case is again determined by (20) . Condition (20) reveals that the 
total social value of exports, if firms smuggle, is less than the 
total social value of exports for the legal trade alternative. 
The welfare result for this case is ambiguous: The (DPR) 
increases and income declines and therefore the welfare effect of 
smuggling is ambiguous when smuggling coexists with strictly 
legal trade. This result implies the "less smuggling the better" 
result of Bhagwati and Hansen does not hold when firms are risk 
averse. 
The next issue to be addressed is the effect of increased 
enforcement on smuggling and welfare. starting with the 
assumptions that there is not a significant real resource cost 
associated with smuggling and firms are risk neutral, increased 
enforcement will have a negative effect on the (DPR) if (p•F < 
t) , and eliminate smuggling when the level of expected punishment 
becomes greater than the export tax. Equation (8) and condition 
(12) verify the last statement: 1) if enforcement is increased, 
then (P*) declines as equation (8) indicates; and 2) if the value 
of (P*) declines below (P1 ), then condition (12) states that all 
smuggling will end. Under the "no real cost" assumption, 
increased enforcement has a negative impact on welfare due to its 
negative effect of the (DPR) . 
Relaxing the "no real cost" assumption, the welfare effect 
of smuggling is shown to be either ambiguous or strictly 
positive. The welfare result is dependent on the real resource 
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cost, the value of expected punishment and the risk premium 
(ff*=O) . The welfare effect of increased enforcement is ambiguous 
(negative) if the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous 
(positive) . 
Relaxing the assumption of risk neutrality, for the risk 
averse case, when smuggling has a positive (ambiguous) impact on 
welfare, the welfare effect of increased enforcement is negative 
(ambiguous) . 
The next issue to be discussed is the results contained in a 
paper by Sheikh (1989) . Sheikh argues that the ambiguous welfare 
results derived in the earlier literature are the direct result 
of smugglers being risk preferring. This paper's model 
demonstrates that it is the assumption on the magnitude of the 
real resource cost that generates the ambiguous welfare result. 
Sheikh also asserts that incorporating risk by itself lowers 
welfare and thus all previous models over-predict the positive 
impact of smuggling on welfare. This assertion is only true when 
firms are risk averse. However, it is not the inclusion of risk, 
but the assumption of risk aversion that lowers welfare. This 
point is discussed next. 
The final issue to be discussed is the long run equilibrium 
results of the model. This paper examined two firm risk 
preference states: l) risk averse firms; and 2) risk neutral 
firms. The results of the model demonstrate that long run 
equilibrium profit and (DPR) are effected by the state of nature 
assumed about firm risk preference. In the risk neutral case, 
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long run economic profit is equal to zero. The long run domestic 
price ratio is composed of a weighted average of (P8) and (pL). 
Under the assumption of firm risk aversion, long run economic 
profit is positive. However, it is assumed that (�*) represents 
compensation for the mental anguish suffered by firms due to the 
risk associated with smuggling. Thus, excessive profit in the 
non-competitive sense is not being earned. Comparing the two 
states, the long run equilibrium (DPR) is lower for the risk 
averse state. The risk averse state, therefore, reduces welfare 
when compared to the risk neutral state. However, under both 
states of nature it is possible for smuggling to have a strictly 
positive effect on welfare. The state of nature effect in this 
model is consistent with the trade literature on uncertainty. 15 
v. summary. 
A general equilibrium joint product model of smuggling 
incorporating features found in the papers by Bhagwati and 
Hansen, and Pitt was presented in this paper. The results of the 
paper indicate that: 1) smuggling can have a strictly positive 
welfare effect over the legal trade alternative; 2) firms that 
smuggle can coexist with firms that engage in strictly legal 
trade and if firms are risk averse the welfare effect of 
smuggling is ambiguous; 3) increased enforcement against 
smuggling can have a negative welfare effect; and 4) the real 
15 For a discussion of the effect of uncertainty on prices, 
output, and welfare see Batra (1975). 
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resource cost, expected punishment, and firm risk preference all 
play a role in determining the welfare effect of smuggling. 
VI. Appendix (A). 
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation 
(7) are, 
aY/aL = (1-p•F) •Pf•GL + p
f. (1-t) - p* = o, 
aY/as = (1-p•F) •Pf•Gs - p* = O. 
(la) 
(2a) 
The term (Pf), is the fixed international terms of trade and 
(t) is the ad valorem export tax rate. First order conditions 
(la) and (2a) state that the marginal cost of an additional unit 
of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade, be it legal or 
illegal trade. An additional unit of legal trade will result in 
additional legal revenue Pf• (l-t) and additional smuggling reve­
nue (1-p•F) •Pf•GL. 
21 
VII. References. 
Arrow, K. , 1970, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing, North 
Holland, Amsterdam. 
Batra, R. N. , 1975, The Pure Theory of International Trade Under 
Uncertainty, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
Becker, G. , 1968, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach", 
Journal of Political Economy 78, pp. 1-54. 
Bhagwati, J. and B. Hansen, 1973, "A Theoretical Analysis of 
smuggling", Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, pp. 172-187. 
Cooper, R. , 1974, "Tariffs and Smuggling in Indonesia", in: J. 
Bhagwati, ed. , Illegal Transactions in International Trade, 
(North-Holland, Amsterdam), pp. 183-192. 
Deardorff, A. and W. F. Stolper, 1988, "Effects of Smuggling under 
African Conditions: A Factual, Institutional and Analytic 
Discussion", Seminar Discussion Paper, No. 230, University of 
Michigan. 
Martin, L. and Panagariya, A. , 1984, "Smuggling, Trade, and Price 
Disparity: A Crime Theoretic Approach", Journal of 
International Economics 17, pp. 201-217. 
Pitt, M. , 1981, "Smuggling and Price Disparity", Journal of 
International Economics 11, pp. 447-458. 
Pratt, J. , 1964, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large", 
Econometrica 32, pp. 122-136. 
Sheikh, M. A. , 1989, "A Theory of Risk, Smuggling and Welfare", 
World Development 17, pp. 1931-1944. 
Varian, H. R. , 19 84, Microeconomic Analysis, NY: W. W. Norton & 
Co. 
22 
